Abstract-We propose a security proof for a new class of quantum key distribution protocol namely Improved-SARG04. This protocol differs from BB84 and SARG04 protocol in the sifting process and provably outperforms those protocols against Photon Number Splitting attack at zero error, with secure transmission distance of 125 km of SSMF.
I. INTRODUCTION
UANTUM cryptography or usually termed as quantum key distribution (QKD) is a promising technology for current demand in modern cryptography. As the name implies, QKD offers a solution to key distribution which many in-use cryptography today cannot guarantee. Future inventions (such as faster algorithms and quantum computer) and no reliabletrusted key transmission device or carrier can compromise the security of various applications ranging from commercial transaction services to the highly confidential application in military [1] . Therefore QKD is the answer to this explicit threat because of its security nature that abide to the properties of quantum mechanics [2] .
In practical QKD (using available technology nowadays), photons from laser sources have been used as information carriers, and optical fibers or line-of-sight free space as the quantum channel [3] . For long distance QKD, optical fibers is opted because of its low attenuation [4] . However, practical QKD always exposed to Eavesdropper (EVE) attacks. The use of a highly attenuated lasers that contains multiphoton pulses, leads to photon number splitting (PNS) attack where EVE can keeps some photon without introducing errors in the channel [1] , [5] . This has drawn in work on proofs of security so that practical implementation can lead to secure QKD.
Various works on proofing the security for available protocols in QKD have been derived in order to cater the security needs of a practical QKD [1] . Security proof on QKD protocols such as BB84, Six-State, B92, SARG04 and others have set the objective of making their protocol secure against PNS attack up to some quantum channel distance, an information which makes their implementation with current technology feasible [8] .
Therefore in this paper, we come out with our security proof on Improved-SARG04 (I-SARG04) protocol [6] but limit its analysis on the Intercept and Resend (IR) form of PNS attack and compare its performance against BB84 and SARG04 protocol.
II. SIFTING PROCESS
QKD allows two parties to exchange and establish a length of agreed secret key information securely. In order to achieve this, Alice (Transmitter or sender) and Bob (Receiver) need to send series of key bit information in the form of photon pulses using highly attenuated laser sources. This is a fair estimate to single photon sources as no commercialized pure single photon pulse yet to be introduced, although many works to realize such device are in progress [1] , [3] , [7] . The photons from such sources distributed according to Poisson distribution of statistics and the effective state used for key bit encoding is denoted in Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) respectively.
with µ is mean photon number and n is number of photon in a pulse.
is Alice`s highly attenuated laser pulse with
µ<<1.
As stated earlier, this paper refers to BB84 and SARG04 protocol as the benchmark as both protocols use four quantum states to encode the key bits of either '0'or '1'.
A. BB84 protocol
The BB84 protocol [9] implement its encoding scheme using pair of orthogonal sets such as bit '0' using either For a bit to be accepted, Bob must coincidently use the same basis such that Alice used (the basis to encode her bit during basis reconciliation or sifting process), which resulted in ½ of the Bob`s raw key bits to become the sifted key [9] .
B. SARG04 protocol
This protocol [11] uses a pair of non-orthogonal states to encode the key bit. As an example, eigenstate of x α (|+x> or |-x>) will encode bit '0' while eigenstate of z α (|+z> or |-z>) will encode bit '1'. For definiteness, Bob will accept the bit as key bit only if his measurement results in an opposite state of the chosen eigenstate, as if he used a wrong measurement basis to do measurement. The difference from the BB84 protocol is that Bob does not reveal the measurement basis but Alice will announce a set of state`s pair containing the state that she actually sent to Bob and the a non-orthogonal state representing the other key bit`s value. This sifting technique will result in ¼ sift key length from the total raw key bit received [5] , [10] .
C. I-SARG04 protocol
This variant of QKD protocol [6] , has a slight difference to the original SARG04 protocol. The decoding scheme as described in Fig. 1 , has been redefined such that the correct decision is obtained when Bob choose the wrong measurement basis to measure the actual Alice`s state. His chance of using the wrong measurement basis is ½ regardless of his output measurement. Bob could further rediscover Alice actual state based on the orthonormality or orthogonality of the Alice`s announced pair. Therefore, his sifted key length will be ½ of the total raw key bit [6] and this outcome abided theoretically as in (3). 
Through the brief description of obtaining sifted key length for each protocol above, we can make a fair comparison for the following sections by considering the µ for BB84, SARG04 and I-SARG04 is 0.1, 0.2 and 0.1 respectively. These values indicate the net key rate without EVE at a specified distance is equal for all the respected protocols.
III. PNS ATTACK
As reported in [1] , the need to closing the gap between works focusing on deriving theoretical security proof on the ideal case and QKD setup using available technology in the photonics technology, has so far initiate many efforts of making their proof practical for real QKD setup [1] , [5] , [8] , [10] . These works attribute its motivation mainly to their concern of using highly attenuated laser source which generate multiphoton pulses. The multiphoton pulses will cause a security loophole in case of EVE intervention. We note that all losses in a QKD setup are also attributed to EVE even if she was absent [5] . By holding this important remark, Alice and Bob in real setup are connected by an imperfect fiber line. EVE can manipulate this scenario given that Alice`s source is a multiphoton pulse, to launch her PNS attack. EVE can in principle keep some photons without introducing errors to the remaining photons received by Bob [5] .
There are several PNS attacks been considered to date such as storage attack, unitary interaction, EVE blocks all photon, EVE forcing to let all photons in a pulse go to Bob, and IR attack [1] , [5] and this work limit its focus to IR attack. The IR attack is a variant of PNS attack where EVE can perform unambiguous discrimination of Alice`s state of a multiphoton pulse [5] . Its success is based on Eq. (4) and she can obtain full information of the key bit and produce new photons with the same state she intercept.
where n is the number of photon. The vulnerability of BB84 protocol is severed when EVE can intercept at least 2 photons of a pulse and keep them in her quantum memory [8] . The nature of BB84 protocol encoding in orthogonal basis will allow EVE to decide the key bit information once basis reconciliation is performed.
In the other case, SARG04 and I-SARG04 protocols are more resistant to PNS attack because they use non-orthogonal basis in their encoding. The information that EVE listen from the classical channel (the actual state is sent via quantum channel) during reconciliation process is only Alice`s announced pair for a particular key bit sent during certain time frame. Alice and Bob do not reveal any information of basis used as the BB84 protocol did. Regarding the IR attack, EVE need to get at least 3 photon to enable her to gain full information of the key bit [5] , [8] .
IV. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
In the earlier section, we have pointed out that the channel loss is also attributed to EVE. Therefore if the losses incurred are same such that EVE can intervene on all photon pulses, then the protocol is said to be insecure [8] .
The expected raw key rate can be referred in Eq. (5) In unit dB (6) In order to obtain information of a key bit, EVE has to apply PNS attack on photons fraction of a pulse. Say 1-q. Then if she wants to make sure that her action is unnoticed by Bob, then she has to choose q that abide Eq. (7).
The information that EVE can be obtain by having q as shown in Eq. (8).
In unit bits (8) Note that, each protocol is defined by their own Eve`s information`s rate, given the photons fraction of a pulse, is denoted as R*. Equation (9) and (10) In unit photons/pulse (10) In this analysis, several assumptions have to be made. One has to assume there is no perturbation when EVE was absent. EVE on the other hand performs only incoherent attack on each pulse individually after the sifting procedure. The actual quantum channel can be replaced by a lossless channel, and EVE is not granted any access to ALICE and Bob`s device.
V. RESULT AND DISCUSSIONS
According to the numerical analysis, we can derive a security proof against the IR attack on a QKD system that uses SSMF as the quantum channel for long distance QKD. This result is depicted in Fig. 2 that summarized a secure practical QKD resistant against IR PNS attack. The c δ refers to the critical loss that will allow EVE to have full information of the key bits, where the key bits transmission is no longer secure.
From the figure, the I-SARG04 protocol is more robust at higher link loss (longer link distance) as compared to the others. The selection of µ=0.1 which correspond to its sifting procedure has influenced the performance of the protocol, which achieved up to the robustness of c δ = 31.2 dB (≈125 km of SSMF). Higher link loss than c δ indicate the system is no longer secure and the secret key will be exposed, thus compromising the QKD system security.
Meanwhile, the original SARG04 and BB84 protocol can only guarantee its security no more than respectively These results however does not consider other realistic optical noise appears in single photon detector such as the detector`s dark count. Therefore, we need to rescale lower the Eve`s information according to Alice-Bob`s information compared to the present case that scaled up to maximum of 1.0.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, this paper has derived a security proof for I-SARG04 protocol based on IR form of PNS attack and compares the results against the other two protocols namely the BB84 and SARG04 protocols, which also use four qubit states in their key bit encoding. This protocol provably resistant to respected type of PNS attack up to 125 km, considering a SSMF as the quantum channel and µ`s of 0.1. The BB84 and SARG04 protocols however can only withstand the PNS attack at 54 km and 102km corresponding to µ`s of 0.1 and 0.2 respectively. Therefore, for practical QKD, the I-SARG04 protocol allows for a longer secure quantum transmission distance. 
